Page 6  - Detailed Exhibits

Proof of the controlling agent(s) conflicts of interest: (1) the
US Health and Human Services subsidiaries; (2) Centers of Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC); (3) the National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH); (4) the agencies Contractors;
and (5) the US President’s Advisory Board on Radiation and Workers Health

Definition of Conflicts of Interest

n. a situation in which a person has a duty to more than one person or organization, but cannot
do justice to the actual or potentially adverse interests of both parties. This includes when an individual's personal interests or concerns are inconsistent with the best for a customer, or when a public official's personal interests are contrary to his/her loyalty to public business. An attorney, an accountant, a business adviser or realtor cannot represent two parties in a dispute and must avoid even the appearance of conflict. He/she may not join with a client in business without making full disclosure of his/her potential conflicts, he/she must avoid commingling funds with the client, and never, never take a position adverse to the customer.
-----------------------

ITEM 1 OF 11:


ITEM 2 OF 11:

  accurate dose reconstruction and site profiles:


ITEM 3 OF 11:

  regard to ORAU conflicts of interest

NIOSH%20Oversight%20Team%20Report%20on%20the%20Conflict%20of%20Interest.pdf

ITEM 4 OF 11:



ITEM 5 OF 11:



ITEM 6 OF 11:



ITEM 7 OF 11:



ITEM 8 OF 11:



ITEM 9 OF 11:



ITEM 10a OF 11:  Conflicts of Interest Waiver




§1. Short title

This Act may be cited as the "Federal Advisory Committee Act
Amendments."

§2. Findings and purpose

(a) The Congress finds that there are numerous committees, boards,
commissions, councils, and similar groups which have been established to
advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal
Government and that they are frequently a useful and beneficial means of
furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal
Government.

(b) The Congress further finds and declares that--

(1) the need for many existing advisory committees has not been
adequately reviewed;

(2) new advisory committees should be established only when they are
determined to be essential and their number should be kept to the
minimum necessary;

(3) advisory committees should be terminated when they are no longer
carrying out the purposes for which they were established;

(4) standards and uniform procedures should govern the
establishment, operation, administration, and duration of advisory
committees;

(5) the Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect
to the number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory
committees; and

(6) the function of advisory committees should be advisory only, and
that all matters under their consideration should be determined, in
accordance with law, by the official, agency, or officer involved.

ITEM 10b OF 11




  Purpose

  The President is authorized by Public Law 106-398 to carry out the Energy
  Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. Since
  World War II, many men and women have served in building the Nation’s
  nuclear defense and, in the course of this work, have been exposed to
  beryllium, ionizing radiation, and other hazards unique to nuclear weapons
  production and testing. The purpose of the compensation program is to
  provide for timely, uniform, and adequate compensation of covered
  employees and, where applicable, survivors of such employees, suffering
  from illnesses incurred by such employees in the performance of duty for the
  Department of Energy (DOE) and certain of its contractors and
  subcontractors.

  The Secretaries of Energy, Health and Human Services, and Labor share
  responsibilities for administering the compensation program. Section 3624 of
  Public Law 106-398 authorizes the President to establish and appoint an
  Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, and by Executive Order
  13179, the President has designated responsibility of the Advisory Board to
  the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).

  Authority

  Executive Order 13179, dated December 7, 2000, and Public Law 106-398,
  Section 3624(a)(1). The Board is governed by the provisions of Public Law
  92-463, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 2), which sets forth standards for the
  formation and use of advisory committees.

  Function

  The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health shall (a) advise the
  Secretary, HHS, on the development of guidelines under section 2(b)(i) of
  Executive Order 13179; (b) advise the Secretary, HHS, on the scientific
  validity and quality of dose reconstruction efforts performed for this
  Program; and (c) upon request by the Secretary, HHS, advise the Secretary
  on whether there is a class of employees at any DOE facility who were
  exposed to radiation but for whom it is not feasible to estimate their
  radiation dose, and on whether there is reasonable likelihood that such
  radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class.

  Structure

  The Advisory Board shall consist of no more than 20 public members to be
  appointed by the President. Members shall include affected workers and
  their representatives, and representatives from scientific and medical
  communities. The President shall designate a Chair for the Board from
  among its members.

  Members shall be invited to serve for overlapping terms of up to four years,
  except that any member appointed to fill a vacancy for an unexpired term
  shall be appointed for the remainder of that term. Terms of more than two
  years are contingent upon the renewal of the Board by appropriate action
  prior to its termination.

  Subcommittees composed of members of the parent committee may be
  established from time to time. The Department Committee Management
  Officer will be notified upon establishment of each subcommittee, and will be
  provided information on its name, membership, functions, and estimated
  frequency of meetings.

  The Department of Health and Human Services shall provide administrative
  services, funds, facilities, staff, and other necessary support services, and
  perform the administrative functions of the President under the Federal
  Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 2), with respect to the
  Advisory Board.

  Meetings

  The Advisory Board meets approximately seven times per year. The
  frequency of meetings shall be determined by the National Institute for
  Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and
  Prevention, based on agency needs. The Designated Federal Official shall
  determine and approve the agenda for the meetings in consultation with the
  Chair. A government official shall be present at all meetings.

  Meetings shall be open to the public except as determined otherwise by the
  Secretary, HHS, or other official to whom the authority has been delegated;
  notice of all meetings shall be given to the public.

  Meetings shall be conducted, and records of the proceedings kept, as
  required by applicable laws and Departmental regulations.

  Compensation

  Members who are not full-time Federal employees shall be paid at the rate of
  $250 per day, plus per diem and travel expenses in accordance with Standard
  Government Travel Regulations.

  Annual Cost Estimate

  Estimated annual cost for operating the Board, including compensation and
  travel expenses for members, but excluding staff support, is $1,422,680.
  Estimate of annual person-years of staff support required is 2.75, at an
  estimated annual cost of $396,013.

  Reports

  In the event a portion of a meeting is closed to the public, a report shall be
  prepared annually and shall contain, at a minimum, a list of members and
  their business addresses; the Board’s functions, dates, and places of
  meetings; and a summary of Board activities and recommendation made
  during the fiscal year. A copy of the report shall be provided to the
  Department Committee Management Officer.

  Termination Date

  Unless renewed by appropriate action prior to its expiration, the Advisory
  Board on Radiation and Worker Health will terminate on August 3, 2007.

ITEM 10c OF 11:

  Advisory Board Members’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WAIVER

  Draft of ABRWH Member Conflict of Interest Disclosure Statement

  The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) is very
  concerned with maintaining the transparency of the compensation program
  created by the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
  Program Act of 2000. In an effort to foster a fully open and honest
  environment for claimants and in order to allay any concerns within the
  stakeholder community regarding perceived or actual conflicts of interest for
  Board members, the Board releases the following information:

  Board Member’s Name and Position: Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.D. - Chair

  Professor Emeritus
  School of Health Sciences
  Purdue University
  West Lafayette, Indiana

  Biographical Information: Dr. Paul Ziemer is Professor Emeritus and former
  Head of the School of Health Sciences at Purdue University in West
  Lafayette, Indiana.

  From 1990 to 1993, Dr. Ziemer served as the Assistant Secretary of Energy
  for Environment, Safety, and Health during the Bush Administration. From
  1995-2001, Dr. Ziemer was a consultant for the Advanced Technologies and
  Laboratories, Inc., and served as Chairman of the Board from 1999-2001. He
  earlier served as a health physicist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a
  Radiological Physics Fellow at Vanderbilt University, and a physicist at the
  U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. He is a Certified
  Health Physicist and has been President of the Health Physics Society and of
  the American Academy of Health Physics. Dr. Ziemer recently completed a
  term as a member of the American Board of Health Physics.

  Waiver: Dr. Ziemer has been provided a waiver under 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(3),
  permitting him to participate in the deliberations and recommendations of
  the Board, because the need for his services outweighs the potential for
  conflict of interest. This waiver is expressly limited as described below, and
  will not allow participation relating to specific matters in which he has a
  financial or imputed financial interest. In addition Dr. Ziemer will remain
  subject to the disqualification requirements imposed by 5 C.F.R. §2635.502
  with respect to specific party matters.

  Year Waiver Issued: 2005

  DOE/AWE Sites Where a Conflict of Interest Exists or May Exist That
  Requires

  Recusal for specific matters, such as Site Profile Review, Dose
  Reconstruction Review or SEC Petition:

  - Oak Ridge

ITEM 10d OF 11: 


Serious Conflicts of Interest:
Sanford Cohen & Associates, Inc.
Troy State University





ITEM 11 OF 11:


December 9, 2005


Hon. Michael Leavitt, SecretaryDr. John Howard, Director
Dept. of Health and Human Services National Institute for Occupational Safety
200 Independence Ave., SWand Health (NIOSH)
Washington, DC 20201 2000 Independence Ave., SW
  Washington, DC 20201

Dear Secretary Leavitt and Dr. Howard:

We are writing to request that you personally review a NIOSH Contract Oversight Assessment Report which (1) blesses a NIOSH subcontractor’s conflict of interest who was estimating radiation doses for use in the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program (EEOICP), and (2) overlooks how this conflict of interest led to the use of incorrect data and contributed to a loss of credibility in the science used within the NIOSH program.

The “Assessment of Potential Conflict of Interest Involving ORAUT-TKBS-0019-5 Technical Basis Document for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant–Occupational Internal Dose” has prompted NIOSH staff to weaken—rather then strengthen-- its governing Conflict of Interest (COI) Policy. This will increase the number of people with conflicts of interest writing key scientific documents on behalf of the federal government, and adversely impact the credibility of the government’s radiation risk estimates used to approve or deny compensation claims.

The attached white paper discusses how a NIOSH-funded subcontractor, Carol Berger, was allowed, due to loopholes in the program’s conflict of interest restrictions, to review her own previous radiation dose assessments for a DOE contractor (Martin Marietta Energy System) at the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Paducah, Kentucky site.  It appears that bias towards her own previous work caused her to use faulty science in preparing a NIOSH site profile at the Paducah site. This caused radiation dose to be underestimated. 

NIOSH does not dispute that Ms. Berger reviewed, cut and pasted tables fromher 1992 report for Martin Marietta into a September 2004 NIOSH site profile used for reconstructing radiation doses and making compensation decisions. NIOSH found she never considered published data which contradicted her previous work for Martin Marietta.  NIOSH did not find a violation of its conflict of interest policy. While NIOSH acknowledges that the Paducah site profile should be reviewed and revised to account for the data overlooked by Ms. Berger, they took the wrong message from this case.

Instead of admitting a mistake and fixing it, NIOSH staff used this oversight
report to weaken conflict of interest restrictions nationwide. Given comparable conflict of interests impacting NIOSH site profiles in Hanford (WA), Rocky Flats (CO), Pantex (TX) and Idaho National Labs (ID), there is a need for NIOSH to
develop a broad and effective remedy.

Attached is a white paper which:

1.Outlines where the NIOSH contractor oversight team report failed to identify three violations of the conflict of interest policy in its report “Assessment of Potential Conflict of Interest Involving ORAUT-TKBS-0019-5 Technical Basis Document for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant–Occupational Internal Dose”;
2.Explains that this NIOSH oversight report overlooked the nexus between the appearance of a conflict of interest and potential bias which undermines NIOSH’s scientific credibility; and
3.Analyses how the revised NIOSH/ORAU Conflict of Interest Policy (effective October 11, 2005) weakens important safeguards against conflict of interest, expands the number of people writing critical documents who have a conflict of interest, and how the new policy endangers the scientific credibility of the NIOSH program determinations under EEOICPA.

We recommend that you personally review the new COI policy; request the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health to review the technical and policy issues in the Oversight Team Report and report back to you; and in the interim, suspend the revised COI policy pending your assessment.  Detailed recommendations on next steps are outlined in the attached white paper.

We would be pleased to brief you in detail. Please contact me at 413-536-3858 or 413-531-5787 (cell) if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Richard Miller
Senior Policy Analyst


Encl: White Paper Assessing NIOSH Program Conflict of Interest

Cc:  Advisory Board on Radiation & Worker Health
Bill Cossler, Vice President, USW Local 5-550 (Paducah)

WHITE PAPER ASSESSING NIOSH CONTRACTOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS THEY IMPACT THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP)
DECEMBER 8, 2005

SUMMARY

This white paper:

1.Outlines how a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) oversight report failed to find three violations of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) Conflict of Interest policy in its report “Assessment of Potential Conflict of Interest Involving ORAUT-TKBS-0019-5 Technical Basis Document for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant–Occupational Internal Dose” (OCAS-COT-0015);

2.Shows that this NIOSH Oversight Report skirts the essential issue: whether a conflict of interest possessed by a “Subject Expert” has undermined the quality of the science and led to the underestimation of radiation risk from exposure to transuranic (TRU) compounds such as plutonium and neptunium; 

3.Analyses how recent revisions to the NIOSH/ORAU Conflict of Interest policy weaken important safeguards against conflict of interest and expand the number of people with a conflict of interest writing critical documents, and explains how these changes threatens the scientific credibility of the NIOSH program determinations; and

4.Recommends interim steps to review and remedy the problems.

I.CONTRACT OVERSIGHT TEAM REPORT FAILED TO IDENTIFY THREE VIOLATIONSOF THE ORAU CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY:

ORAU, which is under a $200 million contract to NIOSH to perform radiation dose assessments under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), hired a subcontractor, (Carol Berger), to write “the bulk of” the site profile for the Paducah site, yet this individual was previously employed under contract to Martin Marietta Energy Systems, the DOE’s Management and Operating (M&O) contractor at Paducah, Kentucky, to assess worker exposure to transuranic (TRU) compounds from processing over 100,000 tons of “recycled” uranium1.  While consulting for Martin Marietta, the company was a defendant in claims involving worker exposure to radiation. NIOSH concluded there was no violation of the COI Policy, yet several violations were overlooked or were not investigated.

Violation #1: ORAU failed to issue COI disclosure statement for Carol Berger

The ORAU COI Policy (in effect at the time of the Paducah site profile) states:

“ORAU is committed to full and open disclosure as the best way to prevent conflicts of interest. ORAU agrees completely that “Sunshine is the best disinfectant.”

“The ORAU Team will disclose, for each company and for each individual involved in dose reconstruction, preparation of Site Profiles, research supporting determinations of whether or not to add a class of employees to the SEC, or any other work done by primary authors or reviewers for NIOSH on dose reconstruction or SEC petitions on behalf of the EEOICPA program, information about their past and present work at DOE sites.”

When the site profile was released in September 2004, Carol Berger’s conflict of interest disclosure was not made public. She was not listed on the ORAU web site for the team preparing the Paducah site profile. Her COI disclosure only became public after GAP notified ORAU Project Director Dick Toohey in February 2005.  Failure to follow the disclosure requirement was not noted in NIOSH’s Oversight Team Report, yet the Report concluded that a “violation of the then-current COI Policy did not occur.” Transparency is a central element in managing the COI, and failure to comply is a de facto violation of the COI policy.  NIOSH appears to have made no efforts to ensure disclosure of Ms. Berger’s conflicts, and neglected to point out their own failures to carry out adequate oversight in this regard.

Violation #2: Apparent Failure to Maintain Adequate COI Data Base

NIOSH determined that having someone who was part of a Department of Energy (DOE) contractor’s health physics program write “the bulk of” a chapter in a site profile was not a violation of the prohibition in the ORAU policy. However, ORAU’s policy in effect at the time requires that it maintain a database accessible to ORAU’s EEOICPA team, to NIOSH and to the public (subject to privacy act limitation) which identifies:

“Whether ORAU and its subcontractors and their employees are reviewing reports, assessments, surveys, documents and records that they organizationally or individually have been responsible for authoring, developing or submitting to DOE or its contractors, ORAU will further indicate if ORAU, a subcontractor or individual employees of ORAU or a subcontractor was an unidentified contributor to any such reports, assessments surveys, documents or records.”

NIOSH’s Oversight Report doesn’t disclose whether the previous work of Ms. Berger was identified in this COI database. Since the Report did not discuss compliance with this disclosure requirement, we presume there was no such examination. If this is in error, NIOSH should clarify. Surely if ORAU was managing its conflicts of interest, and NIOSH was policing the process, a disclosure that Carol Berger was reviewing her own previous work would have put up a red flag to ORAU management, NIOSH and the public, and triggered efforts to mitigate the problem.

Violation #3: Individuals were allowed to perform, review or approve site profiles at sites where they were previously employed or for contractors for whom they were previously employed.

The ORAU COI Policy states:

“No individual will perform, review or approve radiation dose reconstructions, site profiles or determination of whether or not to add a class of employees to the SEC for co-workers, DOE facilities at which they were formerly employed, or for contractors by whom they have been employed. Site experts may be employed to advise on site specific issues and incidents as necessary.”

It is not in dispute that Carol Berger was employed by a DOE contractor at Paducah or that she wrote “the bulk of” the NIOSH site profile for Paducah. NIOSH explains away the evident conflict. They assert that writing the “bulk of” a site profile does not exceed the limited role allowed to “Site Experts” in the COI Policy, which (as cited above) is limited to “advise” on site specific issues “as necessary.”  Citing OCAS Senior managers Larry Elliott and Jim Neton (who themselves have a conflict of interest for failing to police conflict of interest and failing to identify technical weaknesses in the Paducah site profile, respectively), the Oversight Report concludes that “Subject Experts may be tasked with drafting the document for which they are designated as the Subject Expert.”  What NIOSH has done is make restrictions on those with an undisputed conflict of interest so elastic as to defeat the protections in the COI Policy. 

Given the “management philosophy” to allow individuals with a conflict to write site profiles, the NIOSH Oversight Team found that a violation of “the then-current COI Policy did not occur.” The Team concluded that while the “language of the [COI] policy was ambiguous, the underlying policy intent was followed.”

Today, Carol Berger is listed on ORAU web site as a “primary author” of the Paducah Site Profile and indicates that she has no conflicts of interest.  NIOSH’s new policy, as implemented, allows individuals with a conflict of interest to serve as primary authors and review their previous work without limitation.  Rather than fixing the conflict and admitting a mistake, NIOSH has chosen to water down the conflict of interest restrictions.

II.SCOPE OF NIOSH OVERSIGHT REPORT IGNORES THE CORE ISSUE: IS FAILURE TO MANAGE CONFLICT OF INTEREST CREATING FAULTY SCIENCE?

The NIOSH Oversight Report selected only two of the many issues raised in GAP’s February 20, 2005 memo:

1) Did the involvement of an individual who had previously performed health physics work at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and subsequently served as the Subject Expert on ORUT-TKBS-0019-5, violate existing conflict of interest policies;

2) Does the Technical basis Document for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant –Occupational Internal Dose developed under the circumstances presented in question 1 above take full advantage of and use the best available data for completing dose reconstructions.

NIOSH’s framing of the issues skirts two central questions:

•Did the contractor’s conflict of interest in reviewing her previous work for a DOE contractor taint the quality of science that was used in the NIOSH dose reconstruction program? If so, what does this imply about ORAU subcontractors with comparable conflicts of interest at Hanford, Rocky Flats, Idaho, and Pantex?

•How could ORAU’s designated “Subject Expert” overlook data in publicly available literature (specifically, the alpha activity ratios used to estimate intakes of transuranics) which indicates that radiation risks were far greater?  Why didn’t four layers of quality assurance/quality control within ORAU and NIOSH catch Ms. Berger’s errors?

NIOSH does not dispute that Carol Berger reviewed and duplicated her own previous work performed for Martin Marietta Energy Systems. She simply cut and pasted alpha activity ratio tables from her 1992 report for Martin Marietta into the NIOSH site profile.

NIOSH acknowledges that the Paducah site profile should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that the best available data is used. Specifically, NIOSH concurs that the transuranic concentrations documented during operations of the ash receiver and pulverizer, and during the converter salvage line incident, should be evaluated to determine their applicability to the dose reconstruction process, because it may not represent expected or bounding . 2

One key scientific question rests on whether Ms. Berger properly accounted for air samples at Paducah which had up to 90% alpha activity from neptunium-237 (Np-237) compared with a range of only 6.9%-22.8% in Ms. Berger’s tables. Berger’s work for NIOSH also underestimated plutonium-239 levels by up to 7-fold.  In the face of significant uncertainty, NIOSH procedures require bounding estimates of potential uptakes to avoid underestimating radiation dose to workers. 

Carol Berger told NIOSH that “the PACE Report3 was used extensively in the development of the site profile document at issue,” however, she managed to overlook extensive references to monthly health physics reports which, NIOSH now concedes, would have resulted in higher internal doses for certain worker classifications than Berger had used in her previous work for Martin Marietta.  She “did not recall a specific assessment of activity fractions or other related reference materials cited in the PACE Report,” according to NIOSH, yet the validity her Martin Marietta report was pointedly challenged in a chapter of the PACE report entitled “Prior Radiological and Health Assessments at Gaseous Diffusion Plants4.”  Her use of the PACE report appears to be selective.

In cutting and pasting her 1992 work for Martin Marietta into the NIOSH site profile, Berger underestimated alpha activity fractions for Np-237 by at least 4-fold.  If she had not done so, she would have contradicted her previous work for Martin Marietta. This is a case where a scientist is allowed, due to loopholes in the conflict interest protections, to review her previous work, and where, it appears, that bias towards her own work caused her to use faulty science.  NIOSH asserts that any bias would have been caught by its multiple tiers of review.  But it wasn’t, and NIOSH’s Oversight Team never asks why.

In 2000, Carol Berger’s work for Martin Marietta was critiqued in the PACE report, but these critiques were not addressed in the September 2004 NIOSH Site Profile, nor were they spotted in 3 ORAU reviews by Jay Maisler, the “ORAU Team Lead” (who is employed by Carol Berger), Judson Kenoyer, Dick Toohey, or in NIOSH’s review by Jim Neton (Science Director).

The NIOSH’s Oversight Report glosses over the troubling conclusion that conflicts of interest have tainted the quality of science developed by the NIOSH Office of Compensation and Analysis Support (OCAS). The NIOSH staff had a chance to root out these conflicts, but chose instead to recommend changes that will institutionalize these conflicts. Regrettably, this will taint the scientific credibility of site profiles and SEC determinations.

III.THE ORAU CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY, AS RECENTLY AMENDED, IS SEVERELY WEAKENED AND THREATENS NIOSH’S SCIENTIFIC CREDIBILITY:

NIOSH amended its Conflict of Interest Policy governing the conduct of ORAU and its subcontractors on October 11, 2005. Several changes are noteworthy:

New Policy:“Site experts may be employed to advise on site specific issues and incidents as necessary. Site or Subject experts may be employed in the preparation of key Project functions documents such as Site Profiles or draft SEC petition Evaluations.”

Old Policy: “No individual will perform, review or approve radiation dose reconstructions, site profiles or determination of whether or not to add a class of employees to the SEC for co-workers, DOE facilities at which they were formerly employed, or for contractors by whom they have been employed. Site experts may be employed to advise on site specific issues and incidents as necessary.”

Analysis:Allowing “subject experts” with conflicts of interest to write site profiles or perform SEC evaluations infects the program with avoidable bias. When individuals are employed by NIOSH and have to review their previous work, or that of their co-workers, they are naturally going to be inclined to stick by what they have said previously–right or wrong. It is a human response, and a point of professional pride, not to want to contradict one’s previous work. This potential bias has to be fire-walled out, not built in.  These modifications effectively paper over the Berger conflict of interest, and legitimize the plethora of conflicts of interest which have infected OCAS. Instead of gutting its COI Policy, NIOSH should have brightened the lines to preclude those with conflicts from writing key documents used to make compensation decisions.  NIOSH set up a system where experts with obvious conflicts are holding the pen, and waiting for others to catch their biases in the review process. This is akin to letting influenza infected nurses to work in hospitals with face masks, and waiting for others to find out and remove them. 

New Policy:“TBD (Site Profile) team members may contribute to documents prepared for sites where they or their employer may be conflicted, but cannot serve as document owner.”

Old Policy:None

Analysis:This loophole facilitates evasion of the conflict of interest policy. Non-conflicted team leaders can be bystanders while conflicted team members “hold the pen” and carry out the bulk of the writing and research.

New Policy:“Routine access to completed forms ORAUT-FORM-0051 (corporate conflict of interest) will be limited to ORAU employees with an established need to know the information and who have agreed not to disclose the contents of the completed forms to other individuals who do not have a need to know. Upon request, access to the completed forms may also be granted to certain NIOSH personnel, but only to individuals who have also agreed not to disclose the information to other parties not having an established need to know. As described above, information concerning specific sites where it has been established that an ORAU Team subcontractor has an active COI will be provided in the Website Disclosure Statements of the individual employees of that subcontractor. No distinction will be made, however, between sites where the employee has a personal conflict and those where the employee’s company is conflicted.”

Old Policy: “The critical consideration is not whether COI exists, it does.....Therefore, given these inherent potential conflicts, the contractor selected for the dose reconstruction project, along with NIOSH, must do everything possible to prevent of manage actual and perceived conflicts of interest and disclose all potential conflicts of interest.”

“ORAU is committed to full and open disclosure as the best way to prevent conflicts of interest. ORAU agrees completely that ‘Sunshine is the best disinfectant’.”

“The ORAU Team will disclose, for each company and for each individual involved in dose reconstruction, preparation of site profiles, research supporting determinations of whether or not to add a class of employees to the SEC, or any other work done by primary authors or reviewers for NIOSH on Dose reconstruction or SEC petitions on behalf of the EEOICPA program, information about their past and present work at DOE sites.”

“Printouts about the persons (and their companies) performing dose reconstructions, preparation of site profiles,